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Abstract 28 
 29 
Context:  Financial incentives, including taxes and subsidies, can be used to encourage 30 
behaviour change.  They are common in transport policy for tackling externalities associated 31 
with use of motor vehicles, and in public health for influencing alcohol consumption and 32 
smoking behaviours. Financial incentives also offer policymakers a compromise between 33 
„nudging‟, which may be insufficient for changing habitual behaviour, and regulations that 34 
restrict individual choice.     35 
Evidence Acquisition:  The literature review, undertaken between May 2011 and January 36 
2012, identified studies of financial incentives relating to any mode of travel in which the 37 
impact on active travel, physical activity or obesity levels was reported.  It encompassed 38 
macroenvironmental schemes, such as gasoline taxes, and microenvironmental schemes, such 39 
as employer subsidised bicycles.  Five relevant reviews and 20 primary studies (of which 9 40 
were not included in the reviews) were identified. 41 
Evidence Synthesis:  The results show that more robust evidence is required if policymakers 42 
are to maximise the health impact of fiscal policy relating to transport schemes of this kind. 43 
Conclusions:  Drawing on a literature review and insights from the SLOTH time-budget 44 
model, this paper argues that financial incentives may have a larger role in promoting 45 
walking and cycling than is generally acknowledged.   46 
47 
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Text 48 
 49 
 50 
 Introduction 51 
 52 
During the past century most developed countries have witnessed a considerable rise in the 53 
prevalence of obesity.
1
  A dominant view among economists is that this trend is largely 54 
attributable to a utility-maximising response of individuals to technological progress which 55 
has decreased the price of energy intake (via reduced food prices) and increased the price of 56 
energy expenditure (via growing opportunity costs of physical activity).
2
  Table 1 shows the 57 
impact of these changes on the costs people face when making decisions about physical 58 
activity and food consumption during their daily leisure, work, travel and home-based 59 
activities.  For example, technological innovation in agriculture, food production and retail 60 
has contributed to reduced costs (including time costs) of energy-dense meals, while working 61 
environments have typically become more office-based and sedentary. 62 
 63 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 64 
 65 
This paper is primarily concerned with the impact on decision making of changes in the cost 66 
of travel.  Travel is a hitherto relatively under-exploited area for promoting health behaviour 67 
change, but is potentially important in the “small changes approach” to tackling obesity, 68 
which focuses on small but achievable improvements in physical activity rather than more 69 
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substantial lifestyle changes which have sometimes proved unrealistic.
3
  Since cycling and 70 
walking can be more readily integrated into people‟s busy schedules than, for example, 71 
leisure-time exercise,
4, 5
 these could represent low-cost,
 
acceptable and accessible ways to 72 
achieve 30 minutes of daily, moderate intensity physical activity as recommended in 73 
international guidelines to help prevent obesity and over 20 other chronic conditions.
6-10
   74 
 75 
More specifically, this paper explores the potential for financial incentives to encourage 76 
physical activity through active travel and influence related health outcomes.  Financial 77 
incentives are policies involving a targeted payment to, or withdrawal of monetary resources 78 
from, an individual‟s budget.  They encompass interventions at the macroenvironmental (e.g. 79 
government) and microenvironmental (e.g. worksite) levels,
11
 including positive financial 80 
incentives rewarding active travel,
12
 and negative financial incentives penalising sedentary 81 
travel. 82 
 83 
Evidence Acquisition 84 
 85 
Identification of Relevant Studies 86 
The review identified studies of financial incentives relating to any mode of travel in which 87 
the impact on active travel, physical activity or obesity levels were reported.  The ECONLIT, 88 
Google Scholar, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and PUBMED electronic 89 
databases were searched between May 2011 and January 2012 with terms relating to 90 
“physical activity”, “transport”, “built environment” and “prices”.  Non-English language 91 
6 
 
papers, and studies published before 1997, were excluded.  Five relevant reviews and 20 92 
primary studies (of which 9 were not included in the reviews) were identified (Table 2). 93 
 94 
Data Extraction and Quality Assessment 95 
Information was extracted on:  study place and year; study design; intervention and 96 
population characteristics; and results.  Quality assessment focused on the likelihood that 97 
causal inferences may be drawn,
13
 based on a method originally devised for use in 98 
criminology reviews.
14
 99 
 100 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 101 
 102 
Evidence Synthesis 103 
 104 
Description of Studies 105 
The majority of studies (70%) presented evidence for a particular microenvironmental 106 
scheme.  Together, only a small range of schemes were represented, predominantly involving 107 
free bicycles or local road pricing at specific locations and generally within particular 108 
population subgroups.   109 
 110 
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The majority (67%) of intervention studies used uncontrolled cross sectional analysis of 111 
population-level data which cannot support robust causal inference.  Furthermore, most 112 
considered only changes in travel behaviour or physical activity (87%), so improvements in 113 
health or reductions in obesity can only be estimated.  Higher quality study designs used 114 
included randomised controlled trials (RCT) (20%), although like other intervention studies 115 
these often had short follow-up periods (average 7 months). 116 
 117 
Positive Financial Incentives 118 
One US survey of employers suggested that 26% used financial incentives to boost employee 119 
engagement with worksite health promotion programs.
15
  However, five recent reviews which 120 
included microenvironmental interventions to promote active travel identified just three 121 
examples of positive financial incentives,
16-20
  all involving free bicycles.  One RCT 122 
involving Swedish women with abdominal obesity reported a statistically significant increase 123 
in the proportion of women cycling more than 2km per day after 18 months.
21
  Two 124 
uncontrolled studies found that the Danish “Bikebusters” and the Australian “Cycle100” 125 
schemes led to significant increases in the proportion of trips made by bicycle (from 9% to 126 
28% in “Bikebusters”), although both involved selected participants.22, 23 127 
 128 
Additional evidence, not captured in the five reviews, included an RCT involving 51 older 129 
Americans in which significant differences in average daily “aerobic minutes” were 130 
identified between a group receiving fixed weekly payments of $75 and a comparison group 131 
receiving $50 plus $10 (or $25) contingent on averaging at least 15 (or 40) aerobic minutes 132 
per day each week.
24
  “Aerobic minutes” were measured using pedometers and defined as 133 
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continuous walking (not necessarily for transport), jogging, or running at a rate above 60 134 
steps per minute for at least 10 minutes.  Two further studies reported stated preference 135 
data.
25, 26
  One showed that a £2 daily payment to cyclists could increase cycling by 88%,
26
 136 
although these studies relied on individuals choosing between hypothetical alternatives. 137 
 138 
Many studies in transport economics showed a negative price elasticity of demand for public 139 
transport,
27
  indicating that price reductions would lead to increased demand.  If, as three 140 
studies show,
28-30
 this displaces car journeys (rather than active travel), then increased 141 
physical activity would be expected since public transport use is typically accompanied by 142 
some walking.
31-34
  At the microenvironmental level, in the first study, an RCT reported 143 
statistically significant increases in the proportion of people using public transport (from 18% 144 
to 47%) and reductions in car use (from 50% to 33%) in an intervention group that received 145 
free public transport passes in Stuttgart, Germany.  Respective changes in the control group 146 
were not statistically significant and there were no statistically significant changes in cycling 147 
or walking trips.
28
  In the second study, higher employee physical activity levels were shown 148 
in US workplaces that provided subsidised public transport passes compared to those that did 149 
not.
29
  However, the effect may have been over estimated since work places were more likely 150 
to provide a subsidy if public transport facilities were within walking distance.  At the 151 
macroenvironmental level, the impact of free bus passes, available to older people in England 152 
since 2006, was examined using a logistic regression analysis of the English Longitudinal 153 
Study of Ageing (ELSA).
30
  Eligibility for the free pass was associated with a 51% increase 154 
in the odds of using public transport, while public transport use in old age was associated 155 
with 21% lower odds of being obese, even after adjustment for previous weight status.  A 156 
fourth study, of free bus passes available to young people in London since 2008, showed that 157 
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although increased public transport demand displaced some active travel journeys, physical 158 
activity increased because the pass generated more journeys overall.
35
 159 
 160 
Negative Financial Incentives 161 
At the microenvironmental level, one review identified limited evidence from two 162 
intervention studies about the impact of road user charging on physical activity. 
36
  In 163 
Durham, a 10% increase in pedestrian activity was reported one year after the scheme started, 164 
and in London, distances cycled increased by 30% in London over a three year period.
37, 38
 165 
 166 
In Zoetermeer, Holland, a study showed that 14% of car drivers switched to alternative travel 167 
modes after daily financial incentives of €3 to €7 were given to regular commuters in return 168 
for avoiding specific road sections.
39, 40
  In Stockholm, Sweden, another found a 25% 169 
reduction in the number of car journeys in response to a temporary $2 congestion charge.
41
  170 
Small increases in public transport use and self-reported physical activity levels were also 171 
identified.  In Trondheim, Norway, one study attributed an increase in car journeys and 172 
decreases in public transport use, cycling, walking and car occupancy, to the withdrawal of 173 
road pricing.
42
 174 
 175 
Other microenvironmental evidence includes a study reporting a three-fold increase in 176 
cycling amongst employees at Manchester Airport, attributed to a Workplace Travel Plan that 177 
included increased car parking charges,
43
 and other reports that those Workplace Travel Plans 178 
which included car-sharing financial incentives had the greatest chance of reducing car use.
44
  179 
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A further study of eight Californian workplaces reported a 39% increase in active commuting 180 
attributable to “cashing out”, in which individuals receive payment for not using their free 181 
workplace car parking space.
45
  However, these three studies were poorly controlled and the 182 
changes were small in absolute terms. 183 
 184 
At the macroenvironmental level, two studies identified a statistically significant inverse 185 
relationship between gasoline prices and obesity prevalence (defined as the proportion of 186 
individuals with a BMI ≥ 30 kg/m2).  The first drew cross-national comparisons of 24 187 
European countries.
46
  Using US data, the second suggested that 8% of the rise in obesity 188 
prevalence between 1979 and 2004 was attributable to declining gasoline prices (via reduced 189 
walking and increased restaurant visits).  It implied that a $1/gallon gasoline tax would 190 
reduce obesity prevalence by 10%, with some evidence that women, ethnic minorities and 191 
lower income groups were most responsive to price changes (although this may have been 192 
due to their living in urban areas with public transport facilities).
47
  One further study 193 
involving 20 years‟ worth of cohort data from 5,115 US individuals demonstrated a positive 194 
association between gasoline prices and physical activity equating to roughly 17 minutes of 195 
additional walking each week after a 25c/gallon increase.
48
  The study also suggested that the 196 
price change might encourage individuals to replace physical activity away from home (e.g. 197 
bowling) with activities in the immediate area (e.g. jogging). 198 
 199 
Econometric analysis has also been used to show an inverse relationship between gasoline 200 
taxation and gasoline consumption.
49
  One review estimated that a 10% rise in gasoline prices 201 
was associated with reductions of 3% in road traffic and 2.5% in car ownership.
50
  Although 202 
more active travel cannot be inferred, since car trips are less responsive to gasoline prices 203 
11 
 
than fuel consumption and distance travelled,
51
 some studies did report a positive relationship 204 
between gasoline prices and demand for other travel modes.  For example, one study used 205 
self-reported data from a national survey to claim that cycling increased by 4.7% for men and 206 
3.5% for women after a $1/gallon increase.
52
 207 
 208 
Summary 209 
This review identified only a limited amount of evidence on financial incentives for active 210 
travel.  Although the identified studies provide useful insights into specific interventions for 211 
particular populations, a more general understanding about how people might be expected to 212 
respond has yet to emerge. 213 
 214 
Discussion 215 
 216 
One partial explanation for the shortage of empirical evidence, particularly at the 217 
macroenvironmental level, may be the potential political risks generally associated with 218 
financial incentives.
16, 53, 54
  Negative financial incentives typically require strong justification 219 
since they penalise individuals who happen to have made particular choices, while positive 220 
financial incentives require significant financial investment.
55, 56
 221 
 222 
However, as Figure 1 shows, financial incentives for active travel could be viewed somewhat 223 
more favourably as they fall neatly between regulating (or „nannying‟), which is sometimes 224 
regarded as overly restricting choice, and interventions that provide feedback (or „nudging‟), 225 
which might not be highly effective when used in isolation.
57
  They could also reinforce 226 
12 
 
existing Government priorities such as environmental sustainability, tackling health 227 
inequalities, and economic growth (via reduced congestion and absenteeism).  Furthermore, 228 
implementation may prove relatively straightforward if integrated somehow with existing 229 
transport schemes designed to internalise externalities including congestion, injuries, 230 
pollution,
58
 and even risky driving.
59
  Relevant lessons might also be drawn from financial 231 
incentives used in healthcare to reduce smoking, alcohol and obesity,
60
 improve patient 232 
compliance,
61
 and encourage Chlamydia screening.
62
 233 
 234 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
63, 64
 235 
 236 
In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the complex individual-level impact 237 
of financial incentives on travel behaviour and health, higher quality studies that support 238 
more robust causal inference are required.  Reliance on uncontrolled cross sectional studies 239 
with short follow-up periods particularly limits the potential for understanding downstream 240 
changes, such as body size, or how to prevent people from returning to old habits after 241 
financial incentives are withdrawn.
12, 16, 65
 Such studies may also have limited external 242 
validity if they include only small population subsets, such as ethnic minority, low income 243 
groups in high density urban areas (one study shows that walking to public transport is 244 
especially common in these groups),
31
 or people who have recently moved house.
28, 66
  245 
Furthermore, biased effect estimates can occur if the quality of the built environment, which 246 
may support or hinder active travel,
67, 68
 or other factors such as climate or the supportiveness 247 
of employers are not controlled for.   248 
 249 
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Although RCTs may sometimes be unrealistic or politically untenable,
69
 „natural experiment‟ 250 
designs, in which a “natural or predetermined variation of allocation occurs”,70, 71 provide a 251 
promising alternative. These include intervention studies with large individual-level datasets, 252 
such as those proposed for the evaluation of various UK policy and infrastructure projects,
35, 
253 
72, 73
 and non-intervention studies relating particularly to negative financial incentives, which 254 
rely mainly on observed relationships between population-level behaviour and price changes 255 
over time.  Although the latter provide a weaker basis for causal inference, similar 256 
econometric evidence supported the initial case for tobacco taxation.
74
  With appropriate data, 257 
these methods can also contribute to a deeper understanding of the distribution of health 258 
benefits across different population groups and provide important insights into the types of 259 
financial incentives most likely to deliver long term behaviour change. 260 
 261 
Other insights from economic rational-choice frameworks 262 
 263 
The Appendix to this paper describes how an economic rational-choice framework might be 264 
developed to draw some broader insights into people‟s likely responses to financial incentives 265 
for active travel.  It incorporates elements of the SLOTH time-budget model,
75-77
 and 266 
Lakdawalla-Philipson‟s utility maximisation model,78 developed elsewhere for analysing the 267 
multitude of decisions people make when allocating scarce resources of time and money to 268 
competing demands.  This analysis provides a useful illustration of two broad points that 269 
were not established in the literature review and are in some contrast to existing SLOTH-270 
based analyses which suggest that “leisure becomes the most likely area for increasing 271 
14 
 
physical activity”77 because (for simplicity) the trade-offs associated with leisure and travel 272 
decisions had been treated as though identical. 273 
 274 
Firstly, the framework suggests that individuals are likely to be at least as responsive to 275 
financial incentives for active travel as those for active leisure, a view reflected in recent 276 
panel data analysis that shows active leisure “comes and goes” and “exercise as part of travel 277 
and work must be emphasised”.79  Secondly, active travel allows people to access work and 278 
leisure activities but, unlike sedentary travel, is also „productive‟ in the sense of enabling 279 
energy expenditure.  Yet established methods for transport appraisal place large monetary 280 
values on travel time savings to justify investment in transport infrastructure on the basis that 281 
(for travel in work hours) savings in travel time convert non-productive time to productive 282 
use.
80-82
 In contrast to car travel, others have argued that this overlooks the potential to use 283 
rail travel productively for work activities.
83, 84
 Similarly, these methods probably favour 284 
faster sedentary travel (cars and trains) over active travel, despite active travel being suitable 285 
for most journeys.
85
  These methods may also have encouraged decline in the availability of 286 
local services that are particularly accessible by active travel.  In the UK, where travel time 287 
savings have accounted for around 80% of the claimed monetary benefits of major road 288 
schemes, the average time that people spend travelling has remained constant since the 289 
1960s.
86
  This suggests that motorway (freeway) expansion has encouraged long distance 290 
travel for access to work and leisure opportunities much further from home.  People who 291 
choose active travel may then experience mobility-related social exclusion,
83
 where they are 292 
disadvantaged in terms of access to services. 293 
 294 
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In the absence of more empirical evidence, further development of a modelling approach to 295 
active travel decisions may prove advantageous; however psychological theories of behaviour 296 
and recent empirical work in behavioural economics should be incorporated alongside 297 
standard rational behaviour assumptions.
87-89
  For example, overly self focused behaviour,
90
 298 
strong habitual behaviour, optimism bias and ingrained social norms may all favour 299 
motorised transport and discourage individuals from giving rational consideration to active 300 
travel modes.
91
  The resulting „car dependency‟ may be reinforced by car manufacturers 301 
through marketing and political lobbying.
92
  These factors, and policies for moderating them, 302 
are explored in Figure 2 in the context of the theory that individual behaviour is determined 303 
by a deliberative system, which assesses options with a broad, goal-based perspective, and an 304 
affective system that encompasses emotions and motivational drives.
93
   The deliberative 305 
system is described in Ajzen‟s Theory of Planned Behaviour as comprising attitudes, 306 
subjective norms and perceived behavioural control.
94
  For example, the Cycling 307 
Demonstration Towns programme in England, in which per capita investment in schemes to 308 
promote cycling was increased in six urban areas to ten times the national average,
95
 might be 309 
viewed as a method of influencing habitual behaviour (“changing the default”) and “status 310 
quo bias”, where people tend to maintain established behaviours unless incentives to change 311 
are significant.  However, studies specifically examining the impact of financial incentives on 312 
habitual travel behaviour have produced inconclusive results.
28, 96
 313 
 314 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 315 
 316 
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In addition to habitual behaviour, excessive driving might also occur because people feel they 317 
ought to drive more often in order to justify the high sunk (i.e. retrospective and non-318 
recoverable) costs they incurred when buying a car.  Like rail commuters with annual season 319 
tickets,
97
 they find additional journeys incur low marginal costs.  Yet, when encouraged to 320 
consider only the (smaller) average cost of each journey, the utility maximising allocation of 321 
resources would involve more active travel.  Though the evidence is limited, „car clubs‟, in 322 
which car drivers hire cars for short periods rather than owning them outright, are reported to 323 
have reduced car mileage (by 33% in Holland),
98
 increased cycling,
99
 and reduced motor 324 
vehicle ownership.
100
  Bicycle hire schemes might have a similar impact in the sense that car 325 
drivers are not deterred by the monetary and other costs (e.g. those arising from 326 
unfamiliarity) of bike purchase.  In the Netherlands, a before-and-after study has attributed 327 
reductions in car use and increases in cycling to such schemes.
101
  Public transport „clubs‟, 328 
which encourage passengers to consider marginal (rather than average) costs by making a 329 
large upfront payment for future discounted public transport tickets, have also encouraged 330 
higher tram and bus use in some Swiss cities,
102
 although any association with fewer car 331 
journeys is unknown.   332 
 333 
 334 
Conclusion 335 
 336 
Recent empirical evidence, complemented by a simple economic rational-choice framework, 337 
suggests that financial incentives for active travel may represent an underused but potentially 338 
promising method for encouraging healthier behaviours.  However, higher quality studies, 339 
17 
 
particularly at the macroenvironmental level, are required if policy makers are to use 340 
evidence of effectiveness to make confident decisions about allocating scarce resources to 341 
such schemes. 342 
343 
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Figure 1:  A hierarchy of policy interventions to support active travel 615 
 616 
Figure 2:  Alternative theoretical perspectives on travel mode choices and active travel 617 
policies
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Table 1:  Examples of the impact of technological progress on the costs of energy intake and energy expenditure  
Activity 
domain 
Costs of energy expenditure Costs of energy intake 
Increasing opportunity costs of 
energy expenditure 
Increasing monetary costs of energy 
expenditure 
Decreasing costs of food consumption 
Sleep N/A (The time spent sleeping has remained broadly constant) 
Leisure Greater opportunity for sedentary 
leisure activities, e.g.  television, 
computers and the internet 
Greater availability of active leisure 
facilities away from home which incur 
a financial cost, e.g. swimming and 
gyms 
Increased availability of restaurants (including fast 
food) 
Occupation Greater availability of, and higher 
wages associated with, sedentary 
work 
The change from an agricultural or 
industrial society means that, in a 
sense, people are no longer paid to 
exercise at work 
Greater availability of mass produced, energy-dense, 
packaged, snack foods which can be consumed “on-
the-go” (and are often heavily marketed, perhaps 
appealing to a lack of self control and hyperbolic 
discounting which apparently characterises food 
consumption) 
Transport Availability of motorised transport 
and investment in road networks has 
provided greater opportunities for 
faster and longer distance journeys 
which are not well suited to active 
travel modes 
N/A  Expansion of “Drive-Thru” takeaway services which 
allow consumption of fast food while travelling 
Home Modern technology (e.g. tools for 
gardening and kitchen appliances) 
allows household chores to be done 
more quickly with less physical 
effort 
N/A Transfer of labour-intensive food preparation to 
intensive farming, supermarkets and factories has 
dramatically reduced the time costs associated with 
food preparation at home.  The availability and 
quality of kitchen appliances such as microwaves, 
fridges and freezers has also improved 
Table
 Table 2:  Summary of review-level evidence relating to financial incentives identified in the review 
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Payment for not 
using a car park 
39% increase in 
active commuting 
Before the 
scheme 
Up 
to 
36 
X X  P 
R
y
e 
(2
0
0
2
)2
3
 [
D
] 
Uncontroll
ed, before 
and after 
study (0) 
 
 
X 
U
K
, 
M
an
ch
es
te
r 
A
ir
p
o
rt
 Car drivers 
(commuters) 
Car park 
charging  (as 
part of a Work 
Place Travel 
Plan) 
A threefold 
increase in 
cycling 
Before the 
scheme 
N
o
t 
re
p
o
rt
ed
 X X  P 
Gasoline prices 
R
ab
in
 (
2
0
0
7
)2
4
 
 [
N
O
N
E
] 
Cross 
sectional, 
observatio
nal study 
using 
linear 
regression 
(0) 
 
2
4
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s Country 
level data 
None Statistically 
significant inverse 
relationship 
between obesity 
levels and obesity 
prevalence 
Cross-national 
comparisons are 
made 
N
/A
 (
C
ro
ss
 s
ec
ti
o
n
) 
X  X P 
C
o
u
rt
em
ar
ch
e 
(2
0
1
1
)2
5
 
[N
O
N
E
] 
Individual 
level 
repeated 
cross 
sectional 
study (0) 
 
U
S
A
 Adults None Statistically 
significant inverse 
relationship 
between obesity 
levels and obesity 
prevalence 
Changes in gas 
prices over time 
2
0
 y
ea
rs
 
X X X I 
H
o
u
 (
2
0
1
1
) 
2
6
 
[N
O
N
E
] 
Random-
effect 
longitudina
l 
regression 
using 
individual 
level data 
(3) 
 
U
S
A
, 
fo
u
r 
ci
ti
es
 Young adults 
(18-30 at 
baseline) 
None Statistically 
significant 
relationship 
between gas 
prices and 
physical activity 
Changes in gas 
prices over time 
(the individuals 
act as their own 
controls) 
1
5
 y
ea
rs
 
X X X I 
R
as
h
ad
 (
2
0
0
9
) 
2
7
 
[N
O
N
E
] 
Cross 
sectional 
multivariat
e 
regression 
analysis 
(0) 
 
U
S
A
 Adults None Statistically 
significant 
relationship 
between gas 
prices and self-
reported cycling 
 
Comparison of 
individuals in 
different areas 
with different gas 
prices 
N
/A
 (
C
ro
ss
 s
ec
ti
o
n
) 
X X  I 
 
* A higher score on the checklist represents increasing likelihood that causal inferences may be drawn.  0 = study designs from which causal inferences 
cannot be drawn; 1-4 = study designs from which some causal inferences may be drawn depending on the extent to which there is analysis of change over 
time and whether (observable and unobservable) characteristics are controlled for; 5-7 = study designs most likely to support robust causal inferences (5-6 = 
randomisation in a natural experiment setting; 7 = randomisation in an controlled experiment setting). 
    
  
 
      
 
 
 
Positive  
Feedback 
(“nudging”) 
Negative  
Feedback 
(“nudging”) 
Non-
financial 
incentives 
Non- 
financial 
disincentives 
Positive  
financial 
incentives 
Negative  
financial 
incentives 
Regulation (or 
“nannying”) of 
the individual 
Figure 1:  A hierarchy of policy interventions to encourage active travel 
Higher rungs on the ladder represent decreasing acceptability and increasing intrusiveness (as suggested in the Nuffield 
Intervention Ladder).59  Decision makers should only consider policies on higher rungs of the ladder if policies on lower rungs 
have been deemed to be ineffective. 
Financial 
measures 
directed at 
the 
individual 
Non-
regulatory 
and non-
financial 
measures 
with 
relation to 
the 
individual 
Examples 
 
Motor vehicle access restrictions e.g. in Athens, Greece, vehicles are 
banned from entering the city centre on alternate days and in Santiago, 
Chile, vehicles without catalytic converters are banned at certain times66 
Congestion charging in towns and cities 
Provision of free bicycles and accessories 
Traffic calming measures to slow traffic and increase road traffic journey 
times (e.g. Home Zones which encourage road space sharing between 
pedestrians, cyclists and low-speed motor vehicles)67 
Provision of personalised information about local bus and cycle routes for 
travel to work 
Information provided to employees in a workplace detailing the carbon 
emissions arising from their daily commute to work 
Information provided to employees in a workplace detailing the physical 
activity (and calorie expenditure) arising from different modes of travel for 
their daily commute to work 
R
e
s
tr
ic
t 
c
h
o
ic
e
 
 
G
u
id
e
 a
n
d
 e
n
a
b
le
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h
o
ic
e
 (
“m
a
k
in
g
 h
e
a
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h
ie
r 
c
h
o
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e
s
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a
s
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r”
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Figure
Broad theoretical framework Impact on journey decision Active Travel Policy (Example) Behavioural 
economics 
insights  
(see key 
below) 
T
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l 
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
 
Rational utility  
maximisation theory 
“I will consider active travel 
alongside other options for each 
individual journey by weighing up 
the relative costs and benefits” 
Financial incentives to alter the utility maximising 
allocation of resources (e.g. congestion charging) 
P
s
y
c
h
o
lo
g
ic
a
l 
b
e
h
a
v
io
u
r 
th
e
o
ri
e
s
 
D
e
lib
e
ra
ti
v
e
  
s
y
s
te
m
 
Attitudes (how 
favourable the 
individual 
considers a 
behaviour) 
 
“For my journey to work, active 
travel would be a bad choice” 
Provide people with accurate personalised 
information about traffic congestion on their route to 
work, on the likelihood of poor weather conditions 
(e.g. rain – people overestimate the chances of bad 
things happening), or their impact on the 
environment. 
M,N,D,A,E 
 
Subjective Norms 
(perceived social 
pressure to 
perform a 
behaviour) 
“Most people who are important to 
me think that active travel is not 
well suited to my lifestyle”  
Provide people with information about how other 
people make use of active travel (e.g. celebrities, or 
people outside the immediate community in similar 
locations and occupations) 
M,N 
Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control (ease of 
performing a 
behaviour) 
“For my journey to work, it would 
not be very easy to choose active 
travel”  
Provide a substantial investment in cycling 
infrastructure to encourage people to reconsider their 
travel options (e.g. UK Cycling Demonstration 
Towns)84 
I,D,S 
A
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
 
 s
y
s
te
m
 
Habitual 
behaviour 
“I’ve always driven to work” 
Ensure that new employees have to apply for a car 
parking permit at work rather than being allocated 
one automatically  
D 
Key:77 
M 
I 
N 
D 
S 
P 
A 
C 
E 
Messenger: We are heavily influenced by who communicates information 
Incentives: Our responses to incentives are shaped by predictable mental shortcuts such as strongly avoiding losses  
Norms: We are strongly influenced by what others do  
Defaults: We “go with the flow” of pre-set options  
Salience: Our attention is drawn to what is novel and seems relevant to us  
Priming: Our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious cues  
Affect: Our emotional associations can powerfully shape our actions  
Commitments: We seek to be consistent with our public promises, and reciprocate acts  
Ego: We act in ways that make us feel better about ourselves 
Figure 2:  Alternative theoretical 
perspectives on travel mode 
choices and active travel policies 
Appendix 1 
 2 
This appendix describes an economic rational-choice framework which incorporates elements 3 
of the SLOTH time-budget model,
1-3
 and Lakdawalla-Philipson‟s utility maximisation 4 
model,
4
 developed elsewhere for analysing decisions people make when allocating scarce 5 
resources of time and money to competing demands.  A number of simplifying assumptions 6 
have been made (summarised in Table A1) and more detailed analysis might be possible 7 
using a full economic model similar to Yaniv‟s work on healthy eating financial incentives.5 8 
However, to complement the specific examples identified in the evidence review, the 9 
framework is designed to provide broader insights into people‟s likely responses to financial 10 
incentives for active travel in a way that contrasts with existing SLOTH-based analyses, 11 
which suggest that “leisure becomes the most likely area for increasing physical activity”3 12 
because the trade-offs associated with leisure and travel decisions are treated as though 13 
identical. 14 
 15 
Resource constraints (Y and Z) 16 
Individuals are subject to: 17 
- a time constraint (Z hours in the current period) such that time is allocated to Sleep, Leisure, 18 
wOrk, Travel or Home (SLOTH) activities and, within those domains, to sedentary or 19 
physically active behaviours: 20 
 21 
 (I) 22 
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[where bold letters indicate time allocated to domain-based activities; lower-case s stands for 23 
sedentary activity; p stands for physically active behaviours] 24 
 25 
- an income constraint such that expenditure ($ per unit of time) on leisure ($L, e.g. cost of a 26 
swimming ticket), transport ($T, e.g. cost of a rail ticket) and home ($H, e.g. cost of cooking 27 
ingredients) cannot exceed income (Y): 28 
  29 
        (II) 30 
 31 
Income (Y) is determined by time allocated to work and the wage rate (w, $ per unit of time): 32 
  33 
          (III) 34 
 35 
Utility maximisation 36 
An individual‟s current period utility depends on consumption of Sleep, Leisure, Home and 37 
Transport activities (S, L, T and H), weight in the current period (W) and their own valuation 38 
of their expected weight in the next period (βv (W‟)): 39 
    (IV) 40 
 [where U=utility; mL=distance (miles) travelled to leisure activity; $L/$H=leisure or 41 
home-based expenditure; W=current weight; W‟=expected weight in next period; 42 
βv=discounted value of future weight] 43 
  44 
       (V) 45 
 [where δ <1; g is continuous, concave, increasing in food consumption (F) and 46 
decreasing in energy expenditure (E)]
4
 47 
 48 
Utility increases or decreases in weight, depending on whether the individual is above or 49 
below their (own notion of) “ideal weight” (W0).  They prefer weight gain when below W0 50 
and weight loss when above W0.  Future weight (W‟) is influenced by current period choices 51 
about physical activity and food consumption (E and F).  Energy expenditure (E) increases 52 
with domain-based physical activity (e.g. Lp) and is treated as a ratio of time allocated to 53 
physical relative to sedentary activities: 54 
       (VI) 55 
 56 
Standard economic assumptions state that utility rises with consumption of S, L and H at 57 
diminishing marginal rates and, for given L and H, increases with expenditure ($H and $L).  58 
Distance from home to any specific work (mO) or leisure (mL) activity (e.g. a person‟s own 59 
workplace, or their preferred gym) is fixed, since individuals cannot influence the locations of 60 
those destinations in the short term.  All else equal, people seek to minimise travel distances, 61 
but will choose to travel further (higher mL) to access particular leisure activities which offer 62 
higher marginal utility than those available locally or at home (e.g. a leisure park is only 63 
chosen over gardening if it provides higher utility). In the same way, individuals will only 64 
choose to spend more money on an activity (e.g. swimming) if it provides higher marginal 65 
utility than cheaper alternatives (e.g. gardening). 66 
 67 
Choices about S, L and H are determined by the „last hour‟ and „last dollar‟ rules which state 68 
that if the last hour or dollar invested in one activity (e.g. swimming) provides greater utility 69 
than the last unit invested in another (e.g. home cooking), then each day individuals will 70 
reallocate resources in favour of activities that deliver higher returns (i.e. all else equal, reduce 71 
home cooking [dH < 0] and increase swimming [dLp > 0]).
1
 72 
 73 
This implies that energy expenditure (E) increases only if the utility associated with additional 74 
investment in some physical activity (e.g. swimming, Lp) rises.  Budget constraints mean that 75 
the investment necessary for overweight individuals to achieve their ideal weight (W0) must 76 
compete with other (i.e. sedentary) activities that offer higher utility.  This suggests that 77 
financial incentives ought to be targeted at activities where the opportunity cost of physical 78 
activity is the lowest. 79 
 80 
People choose resource allocations that maximise their utility (U) subject to resource 81 
constraints (Y and Z) such that the opportunity cost of time allocated to Leisure (L), which 82 
increases utility directly, are: 83 
 - Sleep (S) and Home (H) activities which increase utility directly  84 
 - Work (O), which does not affect utility directly, but provides income (Y) for 85 
expenditure in other domains ($L, $T, $H)  86 
 - Travel (T), which increases with distance (mO, mL) travelled to Work and Leisure 87 
facilities, decreases with speed, and typically provides modest utility (e.g. car drivers may 88 
enjoy their in-car entertainment systems, while cyclists may enjoy being outside), or even 89 
disutility (e.g. the frustration arising from unpredictable traffic queues). 90 
 91 
Impact of financial incentives 92 
Financial incentives are interpreted as increasing or decreasing the cost of given activities.  93 
Sufficient reduction in the price of swimming (d$Lp < 0), for example, alters the utility-94 
maximising allocation of resources for some individuals and encourages more swimming.  95 
However, the impact in terms of overall energy expenditure (E) is complex and unpredictable 96 
unless more information about personal preferences (including their valuation of future 97 
weight βv (W‟)) and willingness to trade one activity for another is taken into account.  98 
Consider just two different types of people proposed by Yaniv.
5
  First, the financial incentive 99 
might encourage non-swimmers („non health-conscious people‟) to start swimming at the 100 
expense of sedentary leisure activities (a „substitution effect‟).  But second, the financial 101 
incentive simply increases the income (Y) of existing swimmers („health conscious people‟ 102 
who place a high value on βv (W‟)).  If they also cycle to work, they might be inclined to 103 
respond by increasing travel expenditure ($T) in order to get to work faster by switching to 104 
sedentary travel modes (the „income effect‟).  Although both types of people have benefited 105 
from the financial incentive (in terms of overall utility), energy expenditure (E) only increases 106 
in the first case.  In the second, it might fall.   These alternative scenarios are explored in 107 
Table A2.  108 
 109 
Although their impact seems ambiguous, financial incentives may be most useful for 110 
encouraging physical activity in „non health-conscious people‟ since (for them) the 111 
opportunity cost of additional physical activity is always sedentary activity (so E 112 
unambiguously increases).  Of course this assumes they are actually persuaded to forgo their 113 
sedentary activities.  So the remaining question is how large does the incentive need to be? 114 
 115 
A financial incentive for active leisure (d$Lp) requires a payment that offsets the difference 116 
between utility losses from sedentary activities (e.g. watching less television, dLs<0) and 117 
utility gains arising from more physical activity (e.g. more swimming, dLp>0): 118 
      (VII) 119 
 120 
Consider „non health-conscious‟ people who may place little value on their future weight (βv 121 
(W‟)) and may gain very little direct utility from active leisure (e.g. swimming).  The 122 
incentive payment (d$Lp) must reimburse forgone sedentary leisure activities (e.g. watching 123 
television, Ls) which are of greater value than an equal allocation of time to active leisure 124 
(e.g. swimming, Lp).  According to the „last hour rule‟, the opportunity cost of sedentary 125 
leisure activities is equal to utility associated with any other activity, including work.  In order 126 
to change behaviour, the incentive might need to be relatively large, perhaps equivalent to the 127 
amount they are paid at work (i.e. the wage rate per unit of time, $O).   128 
 129 
In contrast, an active travel financial incentive requires a payment that reimburses the 130 
difference in an individual‟s valuation of forgone sedentary travel (dTs  < 0) and new active 131 
travel (dTp > 0): 132 
      (VIII) 133 
 134 
This active travel incentive could be much smaller than the active leisure incentive (d$Tp < 135 
d$Lp) in some cases.  First, consider a „non health-conscious‟ individual who works 136 
reasonably near home so that active travel is viable in terms of distance, but who currently 137 
always drives.  Noting that their drive to work provides minimal utility directly (compared to 138 
sedentary leisure) but access to work facilities, the opportunity cost of sedentary travel is 139 
relatively small since active travel also allows them equal accessibility.  In this framework, 140 
the only losses arise if sedentary modes are slower, so that the time taken to travel increases 141 
(dT > 0) resulting in forgone O, L and H, or are less comfortable (although this may be 142 
negligible for short urban journeys).  Individuals may also save money if active travel is 143 
cheaper than sedentary travel ($Ts - $Tp).  Second, even if the financial incentive does not 144 
increase the energy expenditure in „health conscious people‟ who are already very active in 145 
their leisure time, these individuals would gain utility if they substitute active travel for active 146 
leisure and use the additional time and income to enjoy more expensive (sedentary) leisure 147 
activities. 148 
Table A1:  Summary of simplifying assumptions 
In the long term, all domains are variable (e.g. people can move home and change their working hours; and better leisure facilities might open locally) but, for 
the purposes of analysing the impact of financial incentives for active travel and active leisure, the discussion in Section 3 makes the following assumptions: 
Domain Time allocated to domain (in the 
short term) 
Physical 
activity 
(in the 
short 
term) 
Rationale and other assumptions 
Sleep Variable Fixed - 
None 
Hours of sleep are not affected by changes in other (time, money) resource allocations 
or physical activity. 
Leisure Variable Variable  
Occupation Fixed Fixed At least in the short term, job, wage, working hours, and work and home locations (and 
so distance travelled) are fixed (although in the longer term, people make choices about 
their job and work hours as with any other decision in the economic framework) 
Wages cannot be saved in one period for spending in another period  
Transport Variable (in terms of speed and 
therefore time), but distance travelled 
(mO and mL) is fixed for given 
activities 
Variable Distance travelled to leisure activities is determined by the quality of local facilities 
(which are fixed, at least in the short term) 
The time and expenditure investment required to travel a given distance varies by travel 
mode (sedentary travel is likely to be more expensive and, in many cases, faster) 
Time allocated to active travel has a similar impact on energy expenditure and weight 
as time allocated to active leisure 
Home Fixed Variable  
 
Table A2:  How the actual impact of financial incentives may deviate from the expected or desired impact 
Financial incentive policy to 
promote: 
Active leisure  Active travel Healthy eating (an example from
5
) 
Example Free swimming lessons Free bikes Thin subsidy 
Desired impact On relative 
prices 
 
Reduction in relative price of physical 
leisure activities (d$Lp < 0) 
 
Reduction in relative price of active 
travel (d$Tp < 0) 
 
Reduction in relative price of healthy 
food 
 
On utility 
max position 
U(last hour of active leisure) > U(last 
hour of other activities) 
U(last hour of active travel) > U(last 
hour of other activities) 
U(last hour of home cooking) > U(last 
hour of other activities) 
On W‟ Increase in energy expenditure (E)  
and decrease in W‟ 
Increase in energy expenditure (E)  
and decrease in W‟ 
Decrease in food consumption (F) and 
decrease in W‟ 
Example of 
actual impact 
on behaviour 
of „health-
conscious 
people‟ (i.e. 
people with 
low fast-food 
food 
consumption 
and high 
exercise 
consumption) 
Income 
effect 
If swim already, then more income to 
spend on other activities (perhaps 
sedentary, e.g. Ts) 
Decrease in E  
If cycle (to work or leisure) already, 
then more income to spend on other 
activities (perhaps sedentary, e.g. Ls)  
Decrease in E 
If home cook already, then more income 
to spend on other activities (perhaps 
sedentary, e.g. Ls) 
Decrease in E 
Substitution 
effect 
If swim already, then may swim more 
often at the expense of other sedentary 
or physical activities 
No change or an increase in E 
If cycle already, then may increase 
length of existing journeys at the 
expense of other sedentary travel or 
other activities 
No change or an increase in E 
May cook more healthy food, which is 
time consuming and sedentary, at the 
expense of other physical activities 
Decrease in E and F 
Example of 
actual impact 
on behaviour 
of „non health-
Income  N/A N/A N/A 
Substitution 
effect 
If not a swimmer, then may swim 
more often at the expense of other 
If not a cyclist, then may cycle more 
often at the expense of other 
If not a cook, then may eat more healthy 
food instead of junk food, using time at 
conscious 
people‟ (i.e. 
people with 
high junk food 
consumption 
and low energy 
expenditure) 
sedentary leisure activities 
Increase in E 
sedentary travel 
Increase in E 
the expense of other sedentary activities  
Decrease in F 
Empirical Evidence Limited
6
 See Section 2 More widely studied 
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